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Managing research projects: the rhetoric of judgment as a source of creativity

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Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present new aspects of the tension between creativity and productivity and improve the understanding on how research can be developed in very restricted environments, such as the context of an organization managed using the methods of Project Management. And more generally, it introduces the rhetoric of judgment as a fundamental aspect involved in the development and specification of projects.

Design/methodology/approach – The theoretical approach is based on the phenomenological theory of human intentional action developed by Alfred Schutz, in which the notion of mental project is more flexible than that of project management. In it the concepts of subaction and repeated action are considered a combination of similar actions already performed. The Kantian notion of judgment is introduced to outline self-persuasion as a fundamental source of creativity.

Findings – The introduction of an extended notion of project and routine involving judgment expands the rational, generic and technical notion of project management. And the rhetorical aspect of judgment, at the individual level, establishes the possibility to deliver unexpected outcomes that are considered creative.

Originality/value – The proposed notions of project and routines mediated through the rhetoric of judgment present theoretical and practical progress in the subject of managing projects.

Keywords Research, Creativity, Project management, Routines, Judgment

Paper type Conceptual paper

1. Introduction

The ideas developed in this paper depart from Hans Siggaard Jensen's (2011) paper "The role of ambiguity in innovation," presented and published in the proceedings of the Second International Conference on Rhetoric and Narratives in Management Research.

Traditionally, scientific research has been detached from any practical purposes, has been concerned with freedom and creativity, and its management explicitly contains the idea of ambiguity and interpretation (Jensen, 2011). However, since Second World War, scientific research has started to be organized into projects and managed with the methods of Project Management aligning scientific research to the work of a machine.

The deterministic nature of project management conflicts with the idea of scientific research as a creative and "intensely personal activity, strongly dependent on the ideas and imagination of individuals or groups of individuals" (Taylor, 2006, p. 2). The of project management practices and techniques were inspired by the Scientific Management tradition whose methods focus on maximizing productivity and led to the creation of the assembly lines. Therefore, project management involves the division of the projects into simple tasks, requires the precise formulation of the projects' goal,

constraints (related to costs and time) and operations, and focusses on productivity, control and accountability of precisely specified projects.

This context reveals the following tension in the management of scientific research: on the one hand, there is a connection to creativity and freedom of choice to foster discovery; and on the other hand, there is an idea of management as being grounded in rational control, planning, and the coordination of the production of scientific output. This tension between creativity and productivity is the opening statement of this paper. In contrast to previous studies, it introduces new aspects of this tension by looking at organizational routines departing from the literature on creativity research. This approach suggests approaching this tension based on the following research question:

RQ1. How is creativity possible in precisely specified projects?

Based on Alfred Schutz's (1953) notion of mental project, subaction and repeated action developed in his theory of Human Intentional Action, this paper introduces a broader notion of project than the one offered by project management, that allows understanding creativity both in specified projects and in projects that are not precisely specified. Moreover, this paper introduces the Kantian notion of judgment and uncovers the role and rhetoric of judgment in executing precisely specified projects.

2. Current approaches to creativity
Current approaches to creativity research include a vast number of disciplines that range from psychology, cognitive sciences, philosophy of science, sociology, economy, to management. Several management disciplines, such as accounting and control management systems, seized on the importance of dealing with subjects implicit in the management of creativity (Adler and Chen, 2011).

The most widely accepted and used definition of creativity includes two key elements: originality and functionality, meaning that an object or an idea is creative if it is original and functional (Woodman *et al.*, 1993; Amabile, 1996; Mumford, 2003; Simonton, 2010; Feist, 2010).

The study of creativity is based on the study of four components and progresses along two perspectives. While the uniperspective view distinguishes between four components to the study of creativity and studies them separately, the multiperspective view studies the interaction between the various components of the study of creativity.

The person component investigates the personality traits or attributes of the individuals "that might be indicative or counter indicative of creative potential" (Kozbelt *et al.*, 2010, p. 25; Feist, 2010, p. 114). The process component focusses on understanding the processes beyond the mechanisms of thought – creative thinking, reasoning and problem solving. Thus the studies on the creative process aim either at understanding the sequence of actions or thoughts that lead to novel productions (Guilford, 1950; Kozbelt *et al.*, 2010). The product component studies focusses on the steps through which a product or service comes into existence and approaches the study of creativity with the idea that creativity is attached to its functional value (Busse and Mansfield, 1980; Mumford and Gustafson, 1988; Briskman, 2008). Finally, the place component is the stream of research in creativity that focusses on the external determinants in which creativity is nurtured and stresses the idea that the quality traits and cognitive processes of individuals do not fully explain the creative phenomenon as the social, cultural and work environment are needed to determine creative thought and action (Simonton, 1975; Amabile, 1983, 1988, 1996).

Social psychologists argue that creativity is the result of an interactive process between environmental constraints, such as the availability of resources, the support of family and friends, social reward and recognition, flexibility and freedom. But also it is a result of a micro interactive process with other individuals, such as motivational orientation, peers, coworkers or evaluators that support your ideas (Amabile, 1983). Considering this, social psychology introduced some important models that are very influential in management science, such as The Componential Theory of Creativity developed by Teresa Amabile (1983) and The Systems View of creativity developed by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1988). This last model develops the role of judgment at the collective level, as a social interaction taking place in the creative process.

The study of creativity in management science is related to the study of the tension between productivity and creativity. The differences on the assessment of creativity in management studies depend on the management approach taken. While Management Control Systems literature focusses on efficiency and productivity based on control, concrete task breakdown, and division of labor, their methods ensure the selection, development and efficient execution of new ideas and procure the organization's strategic alignment (Simons, 1995; Davila and Ditillo, 2009), and without altering their foundations proposes new methods to foster creativity and control simultaneously (Adler and Chen, 2011). The motivational mediator approach to creativity focusses on worker's motivation and self-determination whose goal is to influence the management process (Amabile, 1983, 1996, 1998). Consequently, this approach has been challenging some of the core functions in management – specialization, authority and control. Both approaches have been stimulating the debate on the tension between creativity and productivity.

In contrast to previous studies, this paper introduces new aspects of the tension between creativity and productivity by looking at organizational routines.

2.1 The creative aspect of organizational routines
Organizational routines are considered a central aspect in organized work and a fundamental source through which organizations accomplish what they do (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Segerberg, 1985; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Becker, 2004). Organizational routines are considered the fundamental unit of analysis in organization studies. The idea developed in this paper allows seeing routines not as mere mechanical actions, but involving judgment to be created, accomplished, resisted or changed, enabling the alignment of routines to creativity.

Organizational routines have traditionally been related with rules and protocols and have been considered as "recurrent patterns of behavior" (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 14) deprived from judgment, i.e. as mindless (Ashforth and Fried, 1988) and mechanic (Cyert and March, 1963; Gersick and Hackman, 1990). Therefore, routines were considered "independent of the individual actors who execute them and are capable of surviving considerable turnover in individual actors" (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 320). This notion of routine "enable(s) bureaucracies to organize expertise and exercise power efficiently" (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, p. 94).

Consequently, routines have been viewed as a source of stability, inflexibility, predictability and regularity appropriate in organizational contexts focussing on efficiency and productivity. As a consequence of this routine approach, researchers on creativity view routines as an obstacle to creativity, since they are inhibitors of the intrinsic motivation necessary for creative performance (Amabile *et al.*, 1996; Amabile, 1997). Therefore, routine work is viewed as conflicting with creativity which is viewed as "nontraditional ways of responding to the group's task" (Gersick and Hackman, 1990, p. 73).

Implicit in this line of research is the idea that routines lead to mere mechanical activities, similar to the work of a machine. This is analogous to affirming that individuals who engage in continuous and repetitive work are deprived of judgment, making it futile to look at such individuals as a possible source of creativity. The absence of judgment makes routines recognizable only when patterns are concretely specified and precisely replicable. Such an idea is consistent with the notion of projects in project management but it is inconsistent with a notion of projects that includes some level of ambiguity and requires creativity to be specified. These types of projects, introduced earlier in this paper, comprise a notion of routines with some degree of incompleteness in their specification and development; therefore, they require judgment and suggest spaces for creativity.

Recent research on organizational routines is grounded in the poststructuralist social theory developed by Anthony Giddens (1984) that has introduced the dual connection between structure and agency and has depicted the internal dynamics of routines to account for an explanation of stability and change in organizational studies. Giddens states that routines are "founded in tradition, custom and habit" but they cannot be considered "repetitive forms of behavior being carried out mindlessly" (Giddens, 1984, p. 86).

This approach sees routines as effortful accomplishments encompassing continuous change (Pentland and Rueter, 1994; Feldman and Pentland, 2003). The main characteristic of the resulted pattern of action is that "the performances are functionally similar but not necessarily the same" (Pentland and Rueter, 1994, p. 504). These distinctions capture the procreative aspects of organizational routines. Their article has paved the way to other researchers looking at the transformative character of agency.

Building on this line of thought, this paper develops a notion of routine as a set of similar actions that involves judgment and offers spaces for creativity even in precisely specified projects. This perspective highlights new aspects of the tension between creativity and productivity by looking at organizational routines and connecting them to creativity. Based on the idea that routines are not mere mechanical actions but involve judgment, such the judgment involved in a routine establishes a base for creativity in every recognizable activity or operation, such as scientific research. Ever since Descartes (1637), the use and application of the scientific method is part and parcel of the practices and routines of scientific research. The use of the scientific method in science has been widely associated with the efficiency and the productivity of its outcomes. However, far from transforming scientific activity into a mechanical activity, it shows that every human endeavor requires judgment and that certainly makes it creative. Individuals' judgment responds to the demands and contingencies of the present time and it can be seen in the everyday "procedures and uses" (Emirbayer and Mishe, 1998, p. 1001) of individuals. Individual's judgment enables the specification and development of routines, and anchors them in the participant's agency and creativity.

3. Philosophy of human intentional action in managing creative projects
The following section sketches the possibility to link the notion of routine to creativity, enlarging the notion of routine and connecting it with the possibilities it offers for opening creative spaces, contributing to the management of projects and organizations. Additionally, this section outlines that the development of a project through actions, subactions and routines is a creative activity that involves judgment, which allows formulating other aspects of the tension between creativity and productivity.

The consequences of re-conceptualizing the notion of routine and connecting it to creativity, first assumes that even the most specified or simplified action or activity "requires a certain degree of maneuverability in order to assure the appropriateness at hand" (Emirbayer and Mishe, 1998, p. 980), and second designates judgment as mediator of the structuring context. These assumptions result in a view of the creative activity that occurs even in routinized or restricted environments, such as an organization or a project.

In order to theoretically contribute to the understanding of this subject this paper develops Alfred Schutz's (1953) phenomenological theory of human intentional action. Alfred Schutz (1953) in his paper "Common sense and scientific interpretation of human action" established the foundations of interpretative methods of social sciences, based on the interpretative sociology of Max Weber, and the phenomenological approach to philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Schutz focusses on the purposes and meanings of human actions. He claims that human actions consist of a purpose, a mental project and the physical act, and that only the physical act of people's actions can be directly observed. Therefore, the social sciences have the right, and many times the obligation, to use interpretative methods (Pons *et al.*, 2003; Bonet *et al.*, 2007).

Schutz's theory of human intentional action considers that each intentional action changes the present state of affairs into a future one and that each intentional action involves a purpose, a mental project, and the performance of the act. He also introduces the notion of subactions that combined create a new action, and a critical view of repeated actions, which are actions similar to an already performed action. The introduction of Schutz' conceptualizations of the notion of action, mental project, subaction and repeated action enable important contributions to managing projects.

The notion of mental project, which is defined as a mental rehearsal of the future act (Schutz, 1953), is more flexible than the notion of project management. It glimpses and outlines how specifying a project can be more or less difficult, can be very precisely defined or very ambiguous and it can require a very long or very short time, but a mental project always involves imagination and judgment. Furthermore, during the performance of the project, judgment is required for assessing whether its development follows the patterns established in the project or not. Some kinds of projects are rigid and cannot be adapted to unexpected circumstances, while other kinds of projects are flexible and permit a greater degree of adaptation. If the plan is flexible enough, the actor can make adjustments according to what actually occurs during the act, as if it was a hypothesis, and this connects projects to creativity and judgment, and to the execution of specified projects.

In contrast, project management focusses on productivity, control and accountability of all the project's operations and its conceptualization of a project implies the concrete specification of the project's goal, tasks and resources. Its methods must ensure an equilibrium among what is called the Triple Constraint, which contains the specification of the scope, schedule and costs of the project (Gido and Clements, 2009). This notion of project assumes that there is a unique and reliable explanation of the project plan that relies on the known causal laws that will rule the project goal, allowing the control and coordination of the future action as it is predictable and appears to be perfectly rational. This approach not only narrows down the notion of project but also its managerial possibilities. The managerial activity is then related to the strict control and coordination of a predictable plan and the deviations a project will undergo during its lifetime will be solved in the same terms.

The notion of subaction, which is part of a more general action, develops our understanding on how creativity is possible within specific projects, as completely new

activities and projects could be organized combining several or sometimes a large number of subactions. In Schutz's critical analysis of the notion of repeated actions, which are similar actions already performed by the actor, creativity takes place in imagining the project, in organizing it with "known" subactions and solving the problems that occur in the performance of the full acts.

This paper relates the critical analysis of the notion of repeated actions to the notion of routines. In a project there invariably are several activities or operations that are repetitive (e.g. the scientific method, the research program rules, [...]), but differently from the common notion of routines, in which the actor does not have to rethink the mental project, as the actor considers that the first and the second actions are equal, here the repeated action or routine is seen as a creative activity involving judgment, as the second action differs from the first in the experience, knowledge and skills of the actor as well as the circumstances of its execution.

Therefore, working with this notion of routines as similar actions opens a space for creativity because the execution of the second action may suggest new ideas or produce unexpected problems that then need to be solved. Repeated actions or routines involve different actions, or at best similar actions (Schutz, 1953) whose differences are not considered relevant by the actor.

Furthermore, the performance of a routine involves judgment because in the performance of the second action the actor must first consider whether or not it is equivalent to the first action and evaluates the extent to which that similarity can be applied to the execution. When an actor performs the second action, she can follow the lines of the project without surprise; but in many cases judgment obliges her to introduce modifications, to solve new problems or to think about other possible developments.

The recognition of routines as creative actions involving judgment gives a new meaning to the management of the tension between creativity and productivity in projects. The idea of routine as a non-repetitive, different or similar action, reviews the notion of routine and establishes it as a creative activity mediated through judgment. The involvement of judgment implies the adjustment of the state of affairs and determines affects the whole operation of the project.

4. The concept of judgment and rhetoric in managing research projects
The concept of judgment has been defined in several ways allowing to point out that judgment is the mental correlate of a proposition and judgment is the mediated knowledge of an object (Ferrater Mora, 1979). Immanuel Kant in the *Critique of Judgment*, claims that judgment is the capacity "to distinguishing whether something falls under a given rule" (Ginsborg, 2013a, b, citing Kant, 1781). The Kantian notion of judgment contains two conceptual classes: the determining judgment, which subsumes the particular under the universal, and is related to creativity and imagination; and the reflexive judgment, which finds the universal for a given particular and is related to empirical sciences, aesthetics and teleology (Ginsborg, 2013a, b). In teleology, Kant defends that organisms have a finality and that the paradigm of finalities and purposes is a human artifact (and a theory), which comes into being as a result of artisans (and researchers) having a concept of the object they plan to produce (Ginsborg, 2013a, b).

Judgment is a very creative and complex human faculty whose products cannot be the object of a predictive theory. But its rhetorical aspect can be highlighted, which is an important function in making cognition possible. An idea similar to Kant's adequacy between the particular and the general is presented by Aristotle in his book *On Rhetoric*. Aristotle, in order to justify the use of rhetoric in legal proceedings, claimed

that "it is highly appropriate for well-enacted laws to define everything as exactly as possible to be left to the judges […] legislation results from consideration over much time, while judgments are made at the moment (of a trial or debate) […]. But it is necessary to leave to the judges the question of whether something has happened or has not happened, will or will not be, as the lawmakers cannot foresee these things" (Kennedy, 1991, p. 31).

Associating Aristotle's idea of rhetorical judgment to the specification and development of projects introduces an important aspect of the management of projects that has been obviated by project management and its methods, a project cannot foresee everything, a project cannot predict all the operations and constrains; therefore, even if rhetoric is usually associated to public speeches, it is also involved on mental judgments involved in specifying and developing any type of projects.

The logical view of judgment has neglected the fact that human activities involve persuasion, and that the rhetorical activity of self-persuasion is always present in judgment (Bonet, 2014). For instance, Isocrates, a contemporary of Plato, already emphasized that the means for persuading other people are the same for persuading ourselves. In this way, the agentic dimension of rhetorical judgment is a mental activity in which the actor presents arguments to herself and evaluates them, and in which she persuades herself in order to make decisions and specify projects. Delivering appropriate responses to a poorly defined project, developing an idea or crafting the future is an essentially rhetorical and profoundly managerial activity that involves self-persuasion and judgment. Thus the relationship between judgment and rhetoric gives a new meaning to the subject of routine and creativity. Following Kant, the rhetoric of judgment is not only important in the creation of new meanings but also in the adequacy of the rules for a specific activity and for the ways in which these rules can be adapted to each specific case.

At the social level, Trevor J. Pinch and Weibe E. Bijker (1984) emphasize that different actors can give different meanings to the physical or conceptual objects they are working with, influencing in a way their lines of research. Their paper introduces the concept of rhetorical closure in which these various meanings converge into a single one. Their ideas are very influential in the study of research projects. Many projects involve a long period of ambiguity about the object of research. After this period, the research group obtains a single meaning and the rhetoric is closed. The project can then be, more or less, specified but trying to limit the time devoted to this period of rhetorical openness can reduce creativity and the possibilities of the project. These properties make it evident that in many cases there is no clear separation between designing the project and executing it and that, even in well-defined projects there is feedback between them.

At the individual level, there are several mental processes that involve interpretation and judgment, which are also rhetorical. When an actor tries to categorize a future action as similar to or as a repetition of a past action, she engages in rhetorical reflections. In many everyday activities, such rhetorical reflections can be almost mechanical, for instance ordering a meal is not an intricate activity, but in scientific research they can involve complex arguments, counterarguments and doubts, which manifest its rhetorical character. When an actor performs the second action, she can follow the lines of the project without surprise, but in many cases judgment obliges her to introduce modifications, to solve new problems or to think on other possible developments. The subjective experience will result in something intelligible, accompanied by a judgmental act, considered to be the constitutive element of creativity.

On the subject of the rhetoric of management, it is important to outline that its classic notion is introduced in the seminal works of some renowned academics. Since ancient times, rhetoric has been considered a singularly human activity and has been referred to as the art of speaking and persuading people with words. This preliminary notion of rhetoric illustrated in Plato's dialogue *Gorgias* discerns rhetoric from logic or dialectics. In spite of its misfortune, rhetoric was first considered as "the discipline for training citizens on the values and virtues of civic life" (Bonet and Sauquet, 2010, p. 122).

5. Rhetoric in management

In the field of management, many works showed that important aspects of managerial activity include subjects that are central to or have been developed in the field of rhetoric. For instance, Chester I. Barnard's (1938) best-known contribution to management theory is related to the rhetoric of power and authority. The acceptance theory of authority supposes a shift in the rationale of the employer and employee relationship and introduces a rhetorical dimension to the manager's authority as it depends on the subordinate's acceptance of the manager's right to give orders. Peter Drucker (1954) argued that "management is not just passive, adaptive behavior; it means taking action to make the desired results come to pass" (Drucker, 1954, p. 11). Henry Mintzberg (1973) points at the frenetic conversational activity of managers; words are used by mangers to make decisions, to negotiate, to give orders and to inform; moreover, they are also used to build their network.

"Contemporary rhetoric includes all kinds of situations in which there is persuasion by words, making possible the study of the rhetoric of management" (Bonet, 2014, p. 2). Antecedents of the introduction and expansion of rhetoric of economics are led by Deirdre McCloskey, who in 1983 published in the *Journal of Economic Literature*, *The Rhetoric of Economics* claiming that it is our duty to "have a standard of Truth beyond persuasive rhetoric to which to aspire" (p. 510). According to John A.A. Sillince (1999) human communication cannot avoid being rhetorical and most of our activities include communication and point at an organizational theory of argumentation. He suggests that organizations institutionalize specialized repertoires to increase their power and influence. Tony J. Watson (1995) goes beyond the manipulative view of rhetoric. His analysis on sense-making of managers of their work and in pursuing their interests extends the definition and scope of rhetoric. In his own words: "rhetoric is involved in all processes of human communication and reality construction" (Watson, 1995, p. 807). In this line of thought other scholars highlight the importance of managers' communication skills at the strategic and entrepreneurial level. Steven W. Floyd and Bill Woodridge (1994, 1997) analyze the role of middle managers and how their interpretations of everyday issues provide innovative ideas to top management consideration. Entrepreneurs' rhetorical skills are fundamental to transfer broad or abstract concepts. Metaphors are a useful communication tool for both sense-making and sense-giving to cope with significant ambiguities. "Through metaphor(s) an organization develops common language, an understanding of the task environment and a means of interpreting events" (Hill and Levenhagen, 1995, p. 1057).

The introduction of judgment as a source of creativity gives evidence of the relevance of the role and relation of rhetoric in management studies and in scientific research. This study introduces the actors' mental activity to interpret the situation and make appropriate judgments as the basis for defining and developing scientific projects and their creativity.

Thus, rhetoric of judgment is as important in everyday mundane communication endeavors as it is for the innovative and creative ones. Through the means of rhetoric we create meaning to reach our goals; furthermore rhetoric guides our actions and influences our interpretations. Creative management and creative managers are rhetorical and projects are the frame to develop their creativity. Consequently, the importance of the rhetoric of judgment is that it is a constructive aspect of managing projects since it is through it that managers are able to create a situation and therefore, the solution. Through rhetoric of judgment, they construct a project, disambiguate the project constraints and identify two discrete stages; the first fosters rhetorical openness and the second which works with more precise aims (Pinch and Bijker, 1984), which are managed in sophisticated ways.

6. Implications of the theory human intentional actions and the rhetorical aspect of judgment in managing projects and research

The role of judgment in guiding our actions clearly reconceptualizes the notion of routines, as similar actions. A routine or similar action involves interpretations and judgments on the adequacy of the rules to a specific activity and on the ways in which these rules are adapted to each specific situation. The judgmental activity procures a creative outcome in any constraint framework an individual deals with. This claim clarifies several previous misunderstandings and identifies new creative spaces.

The role of judgment in guiding our actions and in finding new interpretations of our problems is clearly appreciated when dealing with highly abstract knowledge, concepts or ideas but is also contained in routine work. In this sense, project management distinguishes itself from the common image of an organization structure and its operations, which are viewed as fixed and predetermines of the workflow of action. project management clearly distinguishes between ongoing and repetitive organizational routines or operations, and projects (Duncan, 1996).

Differently from project management this paper emphasizes that this distinction is dubious and that the distinctive feature between organizations and projects lies not in the unlimited repetitiveness of routines that some projects also can display, but in that a project, in a broad sense is "a temporary endeavor." The time dimension adds a new perspective to the work activity, we create organizations to last forever but a project has an end. Already introduced in the theory of human agency, time interacts with the ambiguity of the project goals and purposes and associates them to the interpretations and judgment of the agents undertaking them; this gives to the endeavor a human dimension (Emirbayer and Mishe, 1998). Judgment pervades many levels of human activities and it is a source of organizational change, innovation and creativity. Specification of the projects comes after long periods of self-reflection, in which the researcher reflects on the activity she is willing to contribute to. After a long period of self-reflection she is willing to present her thoughts and arrive at a consensus with her peers.

With the claim that managing creative projects – ideating and executing them, involves judgment because we are constantly interpreting the adequacy of our actions. The rhetoric of judgment or self-reflection offers the possibility to specify a project, as it focusses on determining the adequacy of the activities involved in the project. This mental activity not only reduces the diversity of meanings involved in a given problem or project but includes a large number of modifications that redefine the problem during its development.

The tension between creativity and productivity is that creativity introduces an extensive range of properties, which makes its management dubious. The studies of

creativity and routines are significantly oriented toward the search of a concrete pattern of actions. The pattern of actions has to be clear, and the criterion of concreteness and clarity is connected to the possibility of operationalization, that is the specification of operations that will be able to give answers to the question of "whether a goal – or sub-goal – has been reached or not" (Jensen, 2011, p. 53). But since a repetitive pattern of action involves judgment, the link to productivity, efficiency and exploitation is not direct. Management is no longer only related to the willingness of the creation of a unique pattern of actions that will lead to the creation of a competitive advantage and finally to the design of a routinized pattern of actions suitable for exploitation (Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1991). The reconceptualization of the routines, as similar actions that require judgment, present new spaces for creativity that have not been considered before and affects the management of organizations and projects. The management of creativity resides in managing the distinctiveness between actions that occur at the individual level in each organization.

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