

Toward a Global History of Management Education: The Case of the Ford Foundation and the São Paulo School of Business Administration, Brazil

BILL COOKE
University of York, U.K.

RAFAEL ALCADIPANI
Getulio Vargas Foundation, Brazil

This article presents an archival history of the relationship between the U.S. Ford Foundation (FF), and Brazil's preeminent business school, EAESP (the São Paulo School of Business Administration), and assesses its lessons for today. Contributing to the literatures on the FF and the Americanization of management education, we show how the aspirations of Thomas Carroll, a leader in postwar management education for the FF's idealized, and still prevalent, form of "scientific" business school were thwarted in Brazil. We also show that Carroll secretly engaged with the U.S.-supported Brazilian military dictatorship, suggesting the FF was actively supportive of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. Yet, while Brazilian EAESP actors shaped the school according to their own priorities and ignored Carroll's, they managed to spend the FF's money. Broader understandings of the FF as a "dominating" power in management education, must therefore, be nuanced, taking this subversion into account. More generally, this "first wave" case in the internationalization of management education has lessons for today's management educators, particularly given the burgeoning interest in global management and global management education. Not least, we argue, historic, as well as cultural, reflexivity is an essential requirement of the global management educator.

"As Bertolt Brecht once quipped, 'better the bad new days than the good old days.' Our members in these various regions are seizing the opportunities provided by our globalized scholarly network to strengthen their own scholarly capabilities and to cultivate

their own syntheses of the local and the global."

—(Paul Adler, President-Elect, AcadeMY News, March 2014:3)

"After all, São Paulo is not East Lansing"

—(Ron Boring, 1973b: 6)

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This article is a history of the relationship between the U.S. Ford Foundation (FF), and Brazil's preeminent business school, the São Paulo Business School (EAESP), part of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV).

It is also an exploration of the relevance of that history for contemporary understandings of the past, present, and future of management education, and, we would hope, exemplary in its archival methodology. More specifically, we make two sets of interconnected contributions. First, we contribute to an established "Americanization" literature, which explores the global spread of U.S. management ideas and techniques. Within this literature, business schools are identified as playing an important role, along with, for example, management consultants, and management textbook publishers (e.g., Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002; Kipping, Üsdiken, & Puig, 2004; Üsdiken & Wasti, 2009, Alcadipani & Caldas, 2012). Key U.S. actors in Americanization at the international relations level are the "Big Three," (Parmar, 2012) Philanthropic Foundations; Carnegie, Rockefeller; and our concern here, the Ford Foundation (Gemelli, 1995; Khurana, 2007; Khurana & Spender, 2012). As historians we would argue that the narrative account of the FF's engagement with the São Paulo Business School we go on to provide is a contribution to management education knowledge, in and of itself. This narrative also adds to existing understandings of the 1950s and 1960s efforts by the FF to shape U.S. management education according to a particular ideal and how this program was transmitted internationally. This ideal was particularly associated with Thomas (Tom) Carroll (1914–1971), and remains very much an ideal-type model business school in our sector (In its commitment to positivist sciences this ideal is, according to Van Fleet & Wren, 2005, a hostile environment for historians).

Our second set of contributions is to two intellectual themes that have featured in *AMLE* since its beginning. The more pervasive of these is the concern for the internationalization and globalization of management education, present from Volume 1 Number 1 of the journal, in Mintzberg and Gosling (2002), and recurrent ever since in concerns, for example, for cultural intelligence (Earley & Peterson, 2004), and editorially, in the need for management educators to make business schools more global (Doh, 2010). This has segued in *AMLE* into analyses of the future of business schools per se, which include this international or global dimension. Significantly, Friga, Bettis, and Sullivan (2003) present such an analysis grounded in a history which gives prominence to the role of the FF in the 1950s United States.

This in turn takes us to the second theme, namely the importance of historical perspectives. While less pervasive than the focus on the international aspects of management education, *AMLE* has showcased important contributions to this debate

(Van Fleet & Wren, 2005; Smith, 2007; Madansky, 2008; Cummings & Bridgman, 2011). The theoretical commitments of these articles vary from the poststructural Foucauldian (Cummings & Bridgman, 2011), to traditional historical realism (Madansky, 2008). However, each one has stressed the value of historical understandings per se in management education and advocated the insights such understandings provide into present day management education and its options for the future (Friga et al., 2003, being a case in point). In support of our intention that we turn this historical lens on ourselves, the community of management educators and our institutions, we invoke Ben Arbaugh's (2008: 6) *AMLE* editorial challenge, which recommended scholars:

...study classrooms and other aspects of business schools using conceptual frameworks and methodological approaches that they would use when studying other types of organizations.

Alongside this, and cognizant of Madansky's (2008) *AMLE* critique of the poor quality of business history (admittedly, a different field than management history), we note that for all *AMLE*'s commitment to history per se, it has yet to feature work using the historian's empirical method of choice, namely archival analysis.

STRUCTURE

The next major section of the paper is context, or "contextualizing." We provide an account of the São Paulo School (EAESP), in terms of its current standing and its broad historical parameters, including its founding relationships with various U.S. institutions. This establishes prima-facie substantiation of our claim for an earlier, significant wave of internationalization of management education to that presently identified by Academy Past-President Adler. Following on from a brief outline of Brazil's Cold-War context, and the U.S. support for the coup d'état and the military dictatorship that stayed in place until 1985, but still in contextualizing mode, we set out the FF's role in the formation of management education in the U.S. post-WWII, and Tom Carroll's role and objectives within that.

We then move on to discuss the framing and the method through which we scrutinize the archive and then reassemble our data in a linear timeline, in a section entitled Epistemologies of the Past and Archival Method. This we follow with our archival analysis proper, which considers, in turn, the first FF grant of \$100,000, a second grant, of \$500,000, and the FF's attempts to make sense of where all the money

went. Within all these sections, we track the success, or, as it turns out, failure of the FF to install Carroll's idealized business school at EAESP.

In our discussion, having summarized our contribution to the history of the Americanization of management education per se, we move to consider the lessons of our analysis for current concerns about the internationalization of the Academy of Management, the globalization of management education, and the role of history in management education.

CONTEXTUALIZING EAESP AND THE FF IN BRAZIL

The São Paulo School of Business (EAESP)

EAESP is one of several schools and institutions of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), named for Brazil's president from 1930 to 1945, and 1951 to 1954. FGV is headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, where there is a sister school of Public Administration and Management (EBAPE, which, notably, has replaced INSEAD as a partner in the delivery of the International Masters in Practicing Management presented by Mintzberg and Gosling, 2002 in the first issue of *AMLE*).

EAESP is Brazil's preeminent business school. It is "a full service" school offering undergraduate, post-graduate, specialist and generalist masters training, doctoral training, and executive education. It is the home of Brazil's leading management research journal, *RAE*, and the practitioner journal *RAE-Executivo*. It has nine departments covering the archetypal range of management disciplines across the hard-soft continuum, from operations management, through strategy and marketing, to general management and HRM. It also has departments of law and of public administration. It is triple-accredited by the AACSB, EQUIS, and AMBA, and we return to the significance of this status for our analysis in our Discussion section below.

Although it was not the first business school in Brazil, EAESP was able to consolidate itself as a leader and role model for similar schools there from the mid-late 1950s. This was particularly through the U.S. intellectual and financial support that it was able to garner, as we go on to show. According to Alcadipani and Bertero's Portuguese language account (2014), EAESP has always been a "hybrid" school, with Brazilian and U.S. features. This hybridity is typical of business schools formed with U.S. support around the world (Kipping et al., 2004). In 1954 EAESP's founding partners—FGV and the Brazilian and U.S. governments—agreed that the United States would send an academic mission from

Michigan State University (MSU) in East Lansing to set up the school. At this stage, the FF was not involved. Funding and overall coordination was undertaken by the United States' International Cooperation Agency, (US-ICA), which later became USAID. MSU was to provide faculty members to establish the school, develop its curriculum, and provide MBA training at in East Lansing for Brazilians, along with enabling short visits to Harvard, to build a cadre of Brazilian management professors (in the general sense of academic educators). The intention was that not only would this cadre deliver management education to the emergent class of professional managers in Brazil centered on São Paulo, they would also in turn train faculty to work at other institutions set up within existing universities in Brazil (Reed, 1960; Anderson, 1986). In 1960 Reed stated that after only 6 years of existence, "it is believed EAESP has more faculty members with Masters degrees in Business Administration than do all the universities of Brazil combined" (Reed, 1960: 2).

Founded in 1954, EAESP celebrated its 60th Anniversary in 2014. It has longevity, and national, regional, and global standing. In arriving at this point there was, in its early days at least, a substantial involvement of U.S. actors: US-ICA-USAID, the FF, MSU, and of individuals, for example, Dole Anderson of MSU, and behind the scenes at MSU, its president, John Hannah, who was to become head of USAID (Anderson, 1987). Notable among these individuals in the history of management education generally, is the academic-practitioner, Thomas Carroll. This all underlines our point, with respect to the AoM's current aspirations, that internationalization, with the United States as a "sender" of management knowledge (to use the term widespread in the Americanization of management knowledge literature, e.g., Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002), is not new. Building on Past-President Adler's citation of Bertolt Brecht, if we are to take the case made in these pages for the value of historical understanding, the point is not whether the old days were good, and the new days are bad. Rather it is about how the past (the old) shapes the present, and our understandings of the future (the new); and again, we cite Friga et al. (2003) as an example of modeling the future of the business school which is conscious of this.

The Brazilian Cold-War Context

The events presented here take place during the Cold War 1945–1989. Although so called because there was never an actual "hot" war between its protagonists,

the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it did play out militarily, in open adversarial wars (Korea, Vietnam) and in military support for authoritarian regimes friendly to either the USSR or the USA. Notable cases of the former are Hungary and Czechoslovakia; and of the latter, in Latin America are Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. Here the United States was deeply implicated in the military overthrow of Brazil's democratic government in 1964 and in supporting a regime (with various internal changes of presidency) that remained in place until 1985 (Parker, 2011; Tavares, 2014). This was only 5 years before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unlike the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, subject to Marxist-Leninist centrally planned authoritarianism, Brazil sought to maintain a quasi-market and open economy, by the Keynesian or statist standards of the time (Skidmore, 1988). Pertinent here is that EAESP continued to function during the dictatorship.

The Ford Foundation, and Thomas Carroll's Role in Management Education

The Ford Foundation (FF) was created in 1936 by Henry Ford to avoid inheritance taxes, leaving his family wealth almost intact (Arnove & Pinede, 2007). Initially the FF's work was modest, focused on Ford's company interests in Detroit. However, by the 1940s, the FF held 90% of Ford Motor Company's stocks, making it the richest foundation in the world, and leading to it seeking—and attracting—substantial political and cultural influence (Sutton, 1987). According to Friga et al. (2003: 236) citing Schmotter (1998), this materialized in 1954, with its expenditure of \$35 million on a "campaign aimed to make business schools more academic, research based, and analytical—in essence, more like other academic programs at universities." A driving force behind this initiative was Thomas "Tom" Carroll, born 1914, who by the age of 26 had become assistant dean at Harvard Business School, then, successively after war service, dean of the business school at Syracuse and at the University of North Carolina. Carroll joined the Ford Foundation in 1953, where he rose to the rank of vice-president, before moving on again to become president of Georgetown University, in Washington, D.C. in 1960.

In a 1959 article in the *Journal of the Academy of Management (JAM, now AMJ)* entitled "A Foundation Expresses Its Interests in Higher Education for Business and Management," Carroll offers

a past–present–future structured account of the development of management education. He notes that the FF's interest in management education arises from a 1948 FF internal committee recommendation that it should direct its resources "to work for human welfare," and that part of this required "[t]he improvement of the structure, procedures and administration of our economic organizations" (1959: 155). Carroll had been part of this 1948 committee while at Harvard, and it was as a result of its work that the FF decision to focus on U.S. management education was taken. According to Carroll, a subsequent ad hoc group set up by the FF identified the following four priorities:

1. Improving the organization, administration, and performance of economic units
2. Achieving growth, development and economic opportunity without undue instability
3. Clarifying the appropriate role of government in economic life
4. Improving economic relations among nations (Carroll, 1959: 156).

Khurana (2007) and Khurana and Spender (2012) also argue that more generally the FF, the other members of the Big Three, and the U.S. government together perceived science-based management training as an important mechanism by way of which the United States would meet its postwar goals. However, as we have already shown, Carroll's 1959 account of the 1948 committee did have an international, as well as internal U.S. dimension. Thus Carroll noted that in 1957 the FF had devoted extra funds to "accelerate its efforts to strengthen business education in the United States and *thus indirectly throughout the free world*" (1959:160; emphasis added), and the conclusion of his *JAM/AMJ* article was entitled "International Aspects of Business Education." This stated that the FF was already sponsoring management education initiatives in Europe and Asia, adding

for formal graduate work foreign students come quite often to institutions in the United States. Indeed, the growing prestige of our business schools will probably bring them in increasing numbers. In addition, American professors may be expected to continue to play for some time to come a significant role in training teachers and research personnel overseas (Carroll 1959: 164).

Here, Carroll could be describing the MSU–EAESP relationship. As well as setting out the pragmatic intellectual case for internationalization in this

1959 piece (see also Carroll, 1952) Carroll more generally summarized from Gordon and Howell's FF-commissioned report on business education published in that same year (Carroll, 1959: 158; Gordon & Howell, 1959). Gordon and Howell and Carroll urged business schools take on greater breadth, improved analytical tools, and stronger requirements in the underlying disciplines, especially "in economics, the behavioral sciences, mathematics, and statistics" (Carroll, 1959: 159). According to Khurana and Spender, using its financial power in the United States and abroad, the FF, influenced strongly by the Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA, now part of Carnegie-Mellon) diffused a business education model that "called for greater disciplinary rigor, greater emphasis on quantitative research among faculty, a more rigorous selection of students, and systematic training for faculty and students in the foundational disciplines of psychology, sociology, economics, and statistics" (Khurana & Spender, 2012: 9).

Khurana and Spender (2012), and elsewhere, Khurana et al. (2011) argue that the FF played an important role in the reshaping of U.S. business education, making it more academic and discipline based, driving it toward quantitative, positivist, and economic forms of scholarship. Khurana (2007) identifies Carroll as one of the key sponsors of this drive (see also Pooley & Solovey, 2010). By applying the discipline, rigor, and laws of science to organizations, the FF and others "could build a management science the way others engineered a bridge" (Khurana & Spender, 2012: 9). The FF's success in achieving this goal led to Khurana et al. (2011) labeling it a "dominating institution." According to Khurana et al., *dominating institutions* possess three key characteristics. First, they are capable of brokering across different institutional sectors. Second, dominating institutions can work on legitimizing or stigmatizing organizations or their practices. Last, they create resource dependencies with the key organizations they are trying to change. Whether our data support this categorization of the FF as dominating according to Khurana et al.'s criteria is a point we return to below.

We have described the context of the São Paulo school and the particular concerns of the FF, notably as represented by Tom Carroll in his dual capacities as business school leader and as FF representative. In this, Carroll and the FF sought an expansion of management education within and beyond the United States, as well as to give it a particular,

positivistic scientific orientation. For the analysis that follows, we should note that in our timeline, the establishment of the São Paulo school in 1954 coincides with the launch of the FF's U.S. initiative and predates Carroll's landmark 1959 *JAM/AJM* paper. Moreover, much of the core work in founding EAESP was carried out without any FF involvement, with US-ICA and MSU as the main actors (Anderson, 1987). Insofar as the FF did have a dominating, or at least, a determinative role in the development of EAESP, its goals were apparently congruent with those of other powerful actors. This, again, is a replication of the domestic U.S. scenario described by Khurana (2007) and Khurana and Spender (2012).

EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE PAST AND ARCHIVAL METHOD

Cooke (1999: 83) points out that the choices made in constructing history—for example framing, selecting, and ignoring evidence—are by definition shaped by the present of the historiographer, including its power relations and ideologies. No matter how exact historical accounts attempt to be, they will never be realist, positivistic science. Uniquely (as far as we are aware) for research into philanthropy and Americanization of management education, our archival data are from both the United States and the "receiver" nation, Brazil. From Brazil, we use minutes of meetings held by the EAESP Board of Trustees between 1959 and 1966. This was EAESP's main management body. Its members were representatives of FGV (the parent Foundation), US-ICA (which became USAID in 1961), the Brazilian business community, and EAESP itself. The U.S. source is archival holdings of the Ford Foundation on the São Paulo School of Business Administration (EAESP) project, which at the time of our research were held in the FF building in Manhattan, but which are now located with the Rockefeller Archive in Westchester, New York.

In terms of data analysis, it is increasingly recognized that historians' accounts of historical methodology give those working in management and organization studies little to work on by the standards of their own discipline. Apart from a recognition of the importance and limits of particular categories of sources, modes of analysis of what are essentially qualitative data largely go unexplicated (Rowlinson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014). We recognize here that archival research is based on data which (like all other data), are only a partial representation of a particular reality—they are depleted evidence

of the past, rather than the past-for-itself. We must always recognize too, more mundanely, that we can never be sure that archives are complete—put simply, documents may be missing, or what is important about organizational processes might not be documented or archived. Nor can we assume that the events accounted for in the archive are adequately recorded, if indeed we accept that adequate recording is possible. However, we can assume that archival records are what organizational processes or actors required to be recorded. We never can claim a wholly “objective” interpretation of archival data, and recognize even the choice of a particular archive is a reflection of a priori conditions of practical and intellectual possibility. Yet archival research is still of value, as is qualitative research more generally.

We initially analyze the data as we might interview data, which may be seen with the usual qualitative caveats, as permitting useful representative insight into the case as a whole. Next, at the other end of the spectrum, we follow the premise of elite interviews (e.g., in the Brazilian context, Cooke, Macau, & Wood, Jr., 2012), to seek data that refer to a specific individual or individuals because of their personal significance. Here, that person is Tom Carroll. In the first phase of analysis, we embarked on a process of cyclical data coding and cross-referencing. In this, (see Cooke, 1999) our a priori understandings shaped our data sifting. We were particularly interested in evidence of the role of the FF, given the significance attributed it in the Americanization and management education literature. Part of the evidence sought was, paradoxically, counterevidence. That is, we identified evidence of the agency of FF actors, of the coherence of FF ambitions, and of the extent to which they were achieved; but also, in counterevidence, the agency of Brazilian actors, other non-FF actors, and the extent to which FF ambitions were thwarted. Next, we identified the arguments and logics deployed by each set of actors and how these played out in intended and actual material outcomes. The different archives were initially read and themed by each author, and then compared, as a form of simple triangulation of both sets of codifications. In the second phase, we looked for mentions of Thomas Carroll. The third phase was to reassemble these two sets of selected fragments from our larger archival holding into a timeline, to enable sequences of events to become clearer, and also provide insights into relationships between individual and institutional actors.

ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS: THE FORD FOUNDATION GRANTS TO EAESP

By the time the FF came onto the EAESP scene in any meaningful way, the latter already had a strong relationship with US-ICA, evidenced not least in the latter’s provision of U.S. \$5m for the actual building of the school and the original ongoing funding of the MSU mission, to the tune of another \$500, 000 (see Anderson, 1987). While this had been secured without the FF’s involvement, there is evidence, of informal networks. Despite this largesse, EAESP had faced severe financial difficulties since its founding. MSU mission faculty initially hoped that the Brazilian business community would fund EAESP; however, unlike the United States, Brazil did not have a culture of endowment of education institutions. EAESP therefore had to rely financially on its parent, Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), and ongoing support through the US-ICA “Point IV” program.

The First FF Grant

The FF’s first grant to EAESP is addressed indirectly in Anderson (1987). Its main purpose was to enable the writing of seven textbooks on management in Portuguese, of which only one, or possibly two, books were produced, and Anderson expresses disappointment at the limited success of this grant. Here, we focus on the relationships that led to the award of that first grant and its significance for the longer term FF–EAESP engagement. So, at EAESP’s trustees meeting of September 1956 (EAESP, 1956), it was suggested that FF grant support could solve the school’s financial difficulties. Mr. William Ladd, representing the American business community in Brazil, proposed the FF be approached

through the intervention of Dean Wyngarden of Michigan State University, with the thought in mind that due to existing close relationships between MSU and the Ford Foundation such a grant might be obtained on relatively short notice (EAESP September, 1956: 06).

At first, support from the FF seemed easily acquired. By December 1956, the EAESP Board of Trustees (EAESP, December, 1956) heard that two personal contacts had been made with the FF to explore the possibilities of it funding EAESP. However, on both occasions the response was similar. In a conversation with a FF representative at

a meeting at MSU in East Lansing, the representative perceived

very little chance of aid because they were concentrating on the Middle East, Southern Asia, and Africa, as the areas nearest to the communist dominated countries (EAESP, December, 1956: 07).

A similar reply was given to the MSU dean by Thomas Carroll, by then FF vice-president. The trustees minutes (EAESP, December, 1956: 07) state that Carroll thought that EAESP would not be eligible for FF resources because "Brazil was not in the danger zone."

At the January 1958 meeting of the EAESP Board of Trustees (EAESP, January 1958), it was noted that a board member was going to write to a minister ("Butrick") in the U.S. State Department, asking him to "take the matter up with the Ford Foundation (EAESP, January, 1958: 22). Coincidentally or not, by early 1960 the Ford Foundation was showing "high interest" (EAESP, March, 1960) in considering a grant application from EAESP. In March 1961, EAESP received the MSU director of research for 2 months (EAESP, 1961a). The purpose of this visit was to draw up a proposal to foster academic research at EAESP, which within EAESP was perceived as a crucial step toward establishing a partnership with the FF. According to EAESP files (EAESP, 1961b), the vice-president of FF, Mr. F. F. (sic) Hill, also visited the school in May 1961, and made it clear to the school's dean that the FF would sponsor the development of research activities at the school, provided that EAESP sent a report and a plan to be analyzed by the FF. The FF representative said it was considering making about U.S. \$100,000 available (EAESP, 1961b). When this figure was discussed at the Board of Trustees meeting, one of the Brazilian representatives asked EAESP's dean, "is the Ford Foundation really interested in making such a large contribution toward our school?" (EAESP, 1961b: 5). The amount of money FF was willing to make available to EAESP was, therefore, seen as substantial. However, the FF said it would only give the money if contributions were also sought from the business community in Brazil. The subsequent agreement between EAESP and FF received the blessing of Henry Ford II in person. EAESP's dean was then invited to a social function attended by Ford during a visit to Brazil (EAESP, 1961b). When Ford was informed that the dean was present, he was said to be "very pleased

about the Foundation support of the school" (EAESP, 1961b: 16).

More money was to follow. That the FF was prepared to make such a commitment subsequently suggests that, notwithstanding its ostensible failure to produce textbooks, there may have been collateral aims—of, for example, simply funding the school during financial crisis—that enabled the first FF grant to be seen as a success.

Tom Carroll in Brazil

Following the textbook project, EAESP sought further financial aid, with the broader aim of expanding the school. In June 1964, a visit to assess EAESP's "entire situation" was made by Thomas Carroll, who by then had become president of George Washington University. This was 2 months after the military coup that had taken place with U.S. support (Parker, 2011; Tavares, 2014). Although he had moved on, Carroll was still a leading figure in the FF, regarded as "one of the most important Ford Foundation consultants." The FF documents that preceded Carroll's visit (Carroll, 1964a) showed that they were unhappy with the lack of financial support for the school from the Brazilian business community, and that they were also unsure about the school's capabilities to develop further. Carroll's visit was intended to review the school's position and to look at how it might deliver according to the FF's expectations. In his subsequent confidential memorandum on EAESP, Carroll stated that FF should support the school in an area

without which, as I see it, it would be quite impossible for the school to serve as a viable and dynamic educational institution with great potential for strengthening the Brazilian economy, specially its private sector. I believe it so strongly that I would not recommend any further consideration of a grant that would merely serve to carry into the future the school's status quo (Carroll, 1964a: 1).

Carroll clearly believed that EAESP had the capacity to impact Brazil's economic development and that it was in his power to do something about this. Consistent with his arguments for the reformulation of U.S. management education and the FF's broader interventions in this area, Carroll believed the FF should support the development of high caliber research capabilities at the school. Carroll's assessment (1964a) offers detailed information about

EAESP. He stresses that faculty, although dedicated and vigorous, had low morale due to their low salaries. Undergraduate students who had just finished their studies were earning "substantially in excess" of the EAESP faculty. Carroll also argued that all professors were "research minded." He stated that there was great demand for EAESP courses from potential students and that the school undergraduates at the time were "serious-minded, hard-working and dedicated." He also made favorable comments about EAESP students in other programs, saying they were well prepared.

His account of school administration is not so positive, however. Notwithstanding the successes he sees at EAESP, Carroll is dissatisfied with the competence of its dean, Flavio Sampaio. For Carroll—twice dean himself—Sampaio lacked the management skills, academic credentials, and past achievements to justify his position. But he had just been offered a different position, and Carroll comments, "no effort should be made to dissuade him to accept that offer. Speaking more positively, he should be urged to accept it" (Carroll, 1964a: 3).

EAESP curricula emanated from MSU, but with the difference, according to Carroll, that the case method seemed to be more used at EAESP than at MSU. FGV, the parent foundation, was seen as being in difficulty and unable to "offer any hope of sustainably increased financial support in the foreseeable future" (Carroll, 1964a: 6). Moreover, FGV seemed to be unable to accept that EAESP professors could easily move from academia to business to get better salaries if the situation did not improve promptly. FGV, headquartered in Rio, was also perceived as not giving enough autonomy to EAESP, and the business community was depicted as not being close to the school, even though they were eager to hire its graduates. A copy of the report was also sent to the U.S. Embassy in Brazil with the comment from Reynold Carlson, the FF's chief representative in Brazil, that "since the observations are very candid, would you kindly restrict the circulation to your colleagues" (Carlson, 1964: 1). Carroll clearly had procured detailed and intimate information about EAESP.

All this fed into Carroll's recommendation that the FF should give "sympathetic" (1964a: 6) consideration to EAESP's request, provided that the school, USAID, FGV, and a representative "responsible business leader" presented it jointly as a "consortium." This would ensure that EAESP would acquire adequate physical facilities; a "realistic" tuition fee structure (though a significant increase in student fees); adequate salaries for full-time faculty so they would be

dedicated to the school, and not seek consultancy income; a plan that would guarantee EAESP financial support from the business community; and last, a school management team that was "energetic and informed both as to academic and business matters" (Carroll, 1964a: 4). Such a team would be respected by the school. So beyond a commitment to rigorous scholarly research capacity, Carroll's proposal also sought to ensure EAESP's sustainability in the long term.

But Carroll's support for EAESP was also shaped by another contact. While in Brazil he met Roberto Campos, the Brazilian economist and the junta's Minister for Coordination of Economic Development. According to Carroll, Campos was the power behind the dictatorship's economic plan, a view widely supported in other sources (Skidmore, 2007). Campos was an economist who had served previous Brazilian presidential administrations but was a significant supporter of, and actor in, the dictatorship. Between 1961 and 1964, he had been Brazilian ambassador to the United States, and his pro-U.S. affinities led to him being widely known in Brazil as "Bob Fields" (a literal translation of Roberto Campos into English). At his death in 2001 he was commemorated by the *New York Times* as Brazil's "apostle for the free market" (Rohter, 2001).

We have no evidence that Carroll and Campos, with overlapping terms of office in Washington, D.C. as president of Georgetown University and Brazilian ambassador, respectively, knew each other previously. Carroll reports having had dinner at Campos' ministerial residence and seemed to respect the former minister immensely (Carroll 1964a). Carroll told Campos that he needed to appreciate the strong need for private management education in Brazil as something crucial for Brazil's development and, he argued, all efforts should be made to develop the school as much as possible. Campos in turn commented that the EAESP salary situation was untenable and that it was inevitable that its faculty would continue to seek alternative income opportunities in the market for their services. The FF files show that Carroll and Campos had a relationship of trust (Carroll, 1964a) and that the FF more generally seems to have had important ties with the Brazilian dictatorship. FF's chief representative Carson had, for example, received an early copy of the dictatorship's first economic plan. In a letter to Carlson, Carroll (1964b: 1–2) states:

I was delighted to know that Campos sent you a confidential copy of his economic plan. For the good of both, Brazil and the United States, I

would advise you to find time to go over it and give the benefit of your advice.

The Second Grant

In September 1964 the Ford Foundation grant to EAESP was extended for a period of approximately 5 years as a project entitled "Expanded Program of the São Paulo School of Business and Administration." The amount released by the FF was U.S. \$500,000 (Wilhelm, 1964). If EAESP was to meet the matched funding condition of the grant it would, obviously, obtain double this amount. The FF internal grant acceptance memorandum justified the grant due to the school being at a critical moment after 10 years of existence:

[T]he inflation in Brazil has created difficulties in maintaining salary levels and the school is in danger of losing its younger men recently trained in the United States. With salaries meeting 85% of the total resources, the school is having difficulties in meeting the collateral needs of library, office machines, and related services. The school has been cramped for space utilizing some floors in an old governmental building in downtown São Paulo (Wilhelm, 1964: 1).

The document also states that the consortium proposed by Carroll had already been created and was working. The EAESP leadership problem seemed to be solved; it had a new director said to have the school's full support (Wilhelm, 1964). All other conditions proposed by Carroll for EAESP were endorsed by the FF. The FF's ultimate aim was to have a catalytic strengthening effect to establish EAESP as "the only first class management training center in Latin America" (Wilhelm, 1964: 3). The project memorandum also argued for the expedient need of forming managers to meet the needs of Brazilian economic growth and modernization. Furthermore, Carroll's initial concern to develop high profile, high quality research on Brazilian issues was an important element of the funding. The total U.S. \$500,000 grant was to be allocated to specific categories of activity: PhD fellowships for Brazilian academics to study in the United States (U.S. \$160,000); research trainees and graduate assistantships (U.S. \$150,000); salary supplements and allowances for full-time and evening teaching (U.S. \$75,000); expansion of the research and teaching library (U.S. \$25,000); and teaching materials and equipment for laboratories

(U.S. \$90,000). The payments were to be staged from 1965 until 1968 (Wilhelm, 1964: 4).

Overall, the emphasis of the grant can be summarized as being on EAESP producing "Brazilianized" management knowledge, which however, met standards and categories of scientific rigor that Carroll had previously specified for the U.S. business schools as well as the establishment of capacity and the provision of financial resources to make this knowledge the basis of Latin America leading management education. This was, we suggest, consistent with the broader economic liberalizing agenda of the dictatorship. By the Cold War categories of the time, from the U.S. point of view, Brazil was part of the "Free World." But in any sense other than economic, the dictatorship's political agenda was anything but liberal. Rather, it was deeply conservative and criminally authoritarian. Critics, real and imagined, from across the political spectrum were forced into exile, and worse. Over 400 Brazilian citizens were killed or disappeared, and the human rights offenses of the dictatorship continue to be investigated (Skidmore, 2007; Tavares, 2014). As recently as August 31, 2013, the Brazilian news and media conglomerate *O Globo* felt compelled to issue a public apology for its role in support of the dictatorship (*O Globo*, 2013).

EAESP faculty were not aware of Campos' involvement in the FF project (as far as we are aware), and our revelation of the Campos–Carroll connection is precisely that, a present-day revelation. Soon after his trip to Brazil, Carroll's life was tragically cut short by a heart attack at the age of 51, on July 27th 1964. Whatever the connection between the two men, however, Carroll's plan was to go unfulfilled, apart from the spending of the money allocated for it.

The "Considerable Mess" at the EAESP Teaching Machine

The First Ford Foundation Inspection

In August 1966, 2 years after the new grant was agreed with such high hopes, William D. Carmichael, dean of the S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell, visited EAESP to evaluate the project (Carmichael, 1966). The first thing that Carmichael reports, however, is that "at the time the grant was approved, Gustavo (EAESP dean) and his colleagues were not informed of the intended allocation of the grant" (Carmichael, 1966: 1). Personnel in the New York FF headquarters were astonished by this, but on checking, realized that no official

communication setting the out how the money was to be spent had actually been sent to EAESP (Widdicombe, 1967a). In an internal memorandum to Carmichael, Widdicombe claims that "since Rey Carlson was in rather close contact with the school he did not feel the need to commit much more than skeleton information to paper" (Widdicombe, 1967a: 1). Carlson was no minor bureaucrat and clearly had some political clout: He had by that stage moved on from the FF in Brazil to become Lyndon Johnson's ambassador in Columbia. (Johnson had, in turn, given the Brazilian military strong support in its staging of the coup d'etat; Parker, 2011; Tavares, 2014).

Moreover, as per the plan, EAESP students were paying higher tuition fees, but in Carmichael's mind (1966), this meant that "the school's financial situation had improved significantly, altering the school needs, and making the FF categories artificial," Carmichael also warns that "next to no progress" had been made on sending Brazilian professors to study in the United States, a key element of the FF sponsorship to EAESP. According to Carmichael:

Enrolment increases have made the "institutional cost" of springing a senior man free for overseas studies. [sic] Higher salaries, lucrative consulting opportunities, and growing family commitments have also increased the "individual cost" of embarking on a doctoral program. Moreover, no one in the school has yet attained a doctorate, and the dominant attitude (possibly reinforced by those who have undertaken but not completed a doctoral program) appears to be one of questioning the value of such programs (1966: 3).

This is self-evidently contrary to Carroll's vision of a business and management academy of scientific standing and legitimacy. Pragmatically, Carmichael (1966) argues for EAESP to be permitted to flexibly allocate grant money, so that a higher stipend could be offered to the Brazilians going abroad. He also argues that Brazilian faculty should be allowed to retain their salaries while studying in the United States and describes long conversations with Gustavo about the importance of PhD training for EAESP faculty. Carmichael also remarks that very little progress had been made in acquiring new books for the school library (Carmichael, 1966). This was partly because the school had not yet moved to its new building, and there was insufficient space to place the new acquisitions. But more to the point, Carmichael found that no plan had been made by

EAESP to use the grant's monetary resources under the library development heading. In relation to equipment purchase and teaching material, he states he will be satisfied with the expenditure if "a liberal interpretation of this category is allowed" (Carmichael, 1966: 5). What type of activities research trainees and graduate assistant expenses should cover had not been clear, meaning once again that EAESP did not get precise information on how to spend this money. This too undermines the Carroll vision of scientifically rigorous management educators, as does Carmichael's reporting that the lack of research trainees was due to the lack of research being carried out by EAESP faculty themselves. The "grant-matching" aspect of the agreement was another unresolved question, for example, whether "cash in hand" or "commitment" to support the school would be required by the FF as evidence. Otherwise, the Cornell dean claims that almost all FF resources were used by EAESP for what in FF terms was one budgetary subcategory: the supplementing of staff salaries.

As a conclusion, Carmichael (1966) urged the FF to meet EAESP's Dean Gustavo to discuss the issues raised by his report and strongly suggested that the FF should urge Gustavo to visit similar schools in Latin America, specifically in Peru and Mexico. In general terms, Carmichael's (1966) reports make clear that the FF grant was not being spent on what the FF was expecting and certainly not on those aspects of the intellectual and scientific development of the school which would have been so important to Carroll. As we have said, how this happened is not absolutely clear, but, at the very least, the elements within FF had some responsibility. Carmichael (1966) therefore proposed the FF change the grant expenses categories. He suggests that the allocations to salary supplements and the research trainee and graduate assistants be merged into a new category called "salary supplement and student assistance" (Carmichael, 1966: 6). This would require a budget of U.S. \$225,000 from the outstanding stage payments, all of which would be channeled into the student loan fund for EAESP tuition. The income so derived would enable the supplementation of EAESP faculty salaries. Carmichael's recommendations were accepted in full by the FF, and the loan scheme established at that time still exists.

Grant in Turmoil

Carmichael's concerns led to the FF's new representative in Brazil meeting Dean Gustavo in early

January 1967 (Widdicombe, 1967b). The FF seemed particularly worried about the situation concerning Brazilians not training in the United States as first agreed and about the library. Gustavo was however highly well regarded by the FF and seen as doing a great job. In the meeting, the FF representative stressed the importance of doctoral training for the Brazilian faculty as something that had to be done for the school's future (Widdicombe, 1967b). Gustavo in return emphasized the need to expand the school's faculty by hiring more people and sending them to the United States to get master's degrees. These new staff, once they had returned, could also cover for the more senior staff who would go to the United States to complete PhDs. The library issue was also discussed in depth (Widdicombe, 1967b).

According to Malferrari (1968), EAESP was particularly concerned about the need to spend the grant money on the specific categories because it had come to rely on the nonconstrained allocation of the FF money, not least for faculty salary increases. That EAESP had to follow FF grant categories was considered a "severe blow" to the school's ambitions, and it had to act promptly to arrange other monetary sources to cover the loss. However, once again, FF requirements were not clearly conveyed to EAESP (Sá e Silva, 1968). Little progress was made in sending Brazilian faculty to the United States, or in sorting out the library. According to an FF internal memorandum of October 1967, action was needed to "clear up what appears to be a considerable mess" (Manitzas, 1967: 1). By the end of 1967, Dean Carmichael and the FF representative in Brazil were advising the FF to suspend payments to EAESP "until we and the Brazilians have put the project back on its originally intended track" (Carmichael, 1967: 1). The grant's suspension made the Brazilian school react in the form of a long letter to the FF (Sá e Silva, 1968). In general terms, Gustavo argued that at first the school was not made aware that the grant approved was attached to particular types of use. Only after 14 months had it been advised it was using the money "for purposes that were incompatible with those for which the grant had been approved" (Sá e Silva, 1968: 1). Gustavo also argued that

the possible misunderstandings are due to the lack of adequate communication between the Foundation and the School. Had the terms, which in the Ford Foundation's opinion not correspond to the objectives of the grant, been known on the occasion of the negotiation, it can be imagined that that the grant had been

refused by the Getulio Vargas Foundation. In effect, the São Paulo School of Management was not prepared at the time to launch a training program for its professors within the scale expected by the Ford Foundation, without a total break in its expansion program to which it was already committed. And, if today it is possible for it to comply with the exigencies of the Ford Foundation, it is done not without great sacrifices (Sá e Silva, 1968: 1-2).

Here, local conditions and priorities underpin the logic deployed against Carroll's vision. And, as the letter concludes,

Although the objectives believed legitimate by the Ford Foundation are completely defensible per se, they are not, in our view, the only ones or necessarily the best ways to solve our present problems (Sá e Silva, 1968: 12).

The school's growth in this period was impressive. In 1963 EAESP had 93 full- and part-time faculty members, as well as 1,046 students. In 1972, it had 188 faculty and 2,465 students; that is, in 10 years, more or less, it doubled in size. On its own terms it had been very successful, and the FF's money had clearly been helpful in this respect. It had not, however, spent the money on what Carroll or the FF had intended.

The Resolution

In January 1968, Gustavo and another new FF representative met to try to establish new terms under which EAESP could receive the remaining grant money (Bell, 1968). Gustavo proposed that U.S. professors come to EAESP to offer doctoral training for Brazilian academics. He argued that the school was "overwhelmed by the demands for training and consulting from the Paulista business community." The FF response was that there were problems with this type of PhD program and that the school had to balance immediate need with the long-term development of intellectual quality in the school. Gustavo's proposal was rejected; the FF insisted that EAESP should send its faculty to the United States for doctoral education. It agreed to extend the grant into 1973, that is for another 5 years, and to an extent this worked. By then, 10 EAESP academics had embarked on PhD training. Six had completed their doctorates; two were in Brazil and expected to finish their dissertations by mid-1974; one was still in the United States; and one did not complete

(Boring, 1973a). Since 1954, 60 EAESP faculty members have received U.S. master's degrees through US-ICA/USAID sponsorship; however, those receiving doctorates were a smaller elite group, never a substantial part of the EAESP faculty body.

Closing Down the Grant

In June 1972 George Farris and Thomas Hill made the penultimate FF visit to the EAESP. They spoke to a considerable number of students and faculty and claimed that the early phase of the grant together with other donors' money had "saved EAESP from financial ruin" (Farris & Hill, 1972: 1). They reported EAESP as very successful at training managers, and the school's undergraduate and executive programs were presented in a very favorable light. EAESP was also portrayed as a contributor to Brazil's development through consultancy, even though this was conducted as personal practice by faculty, not an institutional endeavor. Simultaneously, EAESP was reported as having "contributed relatively little knowledge about management in Brazil through research activities" (Farris & Hill, 1972: 4), and it was a concern that "faculty are not available to students because they are away consulting" (Farris & Hill, 1972: 6). Despite the restructuring of the FF grant, salaries were still a problem, equivalent to what an EAESP graduate student would get in a first job. This low basic salary was also a key factor in the lack of research activity by EAESP staff, who instead had to concentrate on consultancy. But it was also claimed that "many of the professional staff were not qualified for this purpose whether by training or by temperament" (Farris & Hill, 1972: 7). Commenting on this report, the FF's Ron Boring called the school a "teaching machine" (Boring, 1972: 2), that was 'still looking, or grasping for the key—the research project or the program—that will bring the school together and help to raise it to the level of academic excellence of which it is capable, but has so far missed' (Boring, 1972: 3). In October 1973, Boring made the final visit to FGV-EAESP. His view is ambiguous. His overall impression is that the school "continues to be that of a bustling, slightly frenetic place where eager, 'time is money' people hurry to perform those things that must be done so that they can get on with more important (money making) affairs" (Boring, 1973b: 1). But he also argues that "EAESP is making a solid and important contribution to professional management in Brazil, a country that continues to ride a crest of spectacular economic growth" (Boring, 1973b: 3). The school is again

portrayed as having considerable difficulties in producing knowledge about the Brazilian business reality and doing the basic work needed to deliver high standards of teaching (e.g., preparing new course material, meeting students after lectures). The faculty dedicated full time to the school were relatively a small proportion, meaning the school was not up to U.S. standards. Moreover, morale was low among this dedicated few, because of their poor salaries. Boring described the school environment thus:

[T]he organization style of the school in all levels is that of free and open encounter. Faculty members openly disagree with the Dean as well as with each other. Students openly criticize teachers and otherwise evaluate school programs. This freedom of expression may be typical of all universities but I was led to think not. I suspect it is a result of the financial independence most faculty members feel. As they are not dependent on EAESP for their financial wellbeing, they can consider their presence more of a voluntary basis than not (Boring, 1973b: 12).

Boring continues in uncompromising language, which again distances EAESP from Carroll's ideal. Given the its potential and compared to other successful institutions, EAESP was an intellectual "wasteland," not least as "the incentives to be an scholar in EAESP are very low" (Boring, 1973b: 5). Boring also extends a particularly rich explanation of the problems he sees facing EAESP:

[T]he reasons for these problems are not difficult to identify. First, EAESP is a business school and as such it is "world oriented." The staff, particularly from the core departments, tend to be action prone, problem solvers—not theoreticians. Their values are often as same as those who have been successful in the business world. They are sophisticated, urbane, and ambitious. Secondly, because business professors (in this setting, at least) are not scholarly oriented, they usually do not create a scholarly climate for others. Thirdly, being located in a large, industrial metropolis, it is far too easy to be seduced by the many lucrative offers and other business opportunities that naturally come their way. Also, urban living typically means a higher cost of living and more expensive social signs of success ("after all, São Paulo

is not East Lansing"). Status on and off campus is usually afforded to those who [succeed] in business, not academia. Finally, the salaries at EAESP are simply not high enough—and are not going to be high enough—to counteract these forces (Boring, 1973b: 5–6).

He concludes by saying the school has proven to be a "fine technical school" that would progress due to the increased need of management training in Brazil, but that it has yet to work to its full potential. In an earlier internal document, Boring (1973a) argues that given the size and importance of FF involvement with EAESP, it "cannot be put to bed without review" (Boring, 1973a: 1). Boring recognizes FF problems managing EAESP's grant by stating that:

[I]n view of the evident misunderstanding and poor communication that existed between EAESP and the Foundation when this grant was made, [there] should be some consideration of the process. The original decision to assist EAESP may or may not have been sound. That is one issue. But we did a poor job of administering it, undoubtedly losing something in the slippage (could have said friction), and that is another (Boring, 1973a: 1).

Upon receiving the final Boring report, William Carmichael, who followed Carroll's path to become a senior executive in the Ford Foundation, sent an internal memorandum stating that "with this excellent document on hand, we shall initiate the formal grant closing process" (Carmichael, 1974: 1). That is, Carmichael calls "excellent" a report which had been scathing about the EAESP and the FF's engagement with it. Carmichael, like Carlson and Carroll, had direct hands-on involvement in this project, so it might be speculated that this was some kind of FF bureaucratic "hushing up" of a troubling project. Certainly, as we have noted here, Carroll's vision of a business school grounded in scientific rigor seemed defeated at every turn, at least up until 1974. By the present, as the school's triple accreditation and its associated research journals of standing suggests, something has happened to enable the school to establish its intellectual, research standing by international standards. We return to this point next.

DISCUSSION

In his advocacy of rigorous historical awareness in management education, Smith (2007:522) argues:

[I]t could be said that a profession or field of study without a memory is a profession/field of mad people. "Mad" people possess energy and are excited; however, they are unwise, as they've lost touch with the realities of the present and lack a connection to the past. We currently run the risk of creating a profession of mad people if we as educators don't expose our students to more history and increase their and our memory and understanding of this field of study.

It behooves us as management educators to avoid this madness in ourselves. If, as Smith suggests, history is a preventative, this substantiates our claim that the historical narrative we have set out is a contribution to our collective sanity in and of itself. Further, our contribution to the broader understandings of the Americanization of management education affirms the view of those researchers (Gemelli, Khurana, Khurana et al., Khurana & Spender) who have identified the FF as a key player in the establishment of business schools in their current form not just in the United States, but globally. In this, we have also confirmed the role of Thomas Carroll as a leading actor. The typical language of the Americanization of management knowledge, which depicts U.S. actors as "senders" and those overseas as "receivers" of management knowledge, and Khurana et al.'s assessment of the Ford Foundation as a "dominating institution" may not be wholly contradicted. The three identifying features they give, rehearsed in our contextualizing section, are clearly present. The evidence shows the FF as *capable of brokering across different institutional sectors*: the United States and Brazilian governments, FGV as a foundation, MSU and EAESP as higher education institutions. Second, if dominating institutions *can work on legitimizing or stigmatizing organizations and their practices*, we see much of this in the case: the legitimization of the school in the first place, particularly, in Carroll's encounter with Roberto Campos, but at the same time, and perhaps, less successful, the stigmatizing of its practices, for example, its lack of scholarly activity in the FF's sense, and the commitments of faculty to consultancy. Certainly the FF did *create resource dependencies with the key organizations they were trying to change*. Yet although dependent, the change that the FF wanted—or, the FF as represented by Carroll—was not to occur, not through the FF intervention. This suggests that nuance is required when exploring specific, but very important

relationships in the internationalization of management education in the past, building on the general recognition that "hybridity" was often an outcome of Americanization (Kipping et al., 2004). Such nuance might, for example, allow for competing agendas *within* the FF, with Carroll's vision for a particular, global form of management education that met universal standards of scientific rigor wherever it was in the world conflicting with FF Brazil Representative Rey Carlson's pragmatic grasp of the realpolitik of the Brazilian situation from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, where, perhaps with a nod and a wink, he permitted the FF's money to be spent on staff salaries. Carlson's motives may have been to keep "Bob Fields," (Roberto Campos) or others in power in Brazil happy, or simply to see EAESP survive through difficult economic and political times, perhaps having a deeper personal affinity for both the school and Brazil than visiting FF consultants could achieve. That he went on to be rewarded by Johnson with the politically sensitive U.S. ambassadorship to Colombia suggests that in the view of the White House at least, he had been thought capable of providing some useful service and not to have been a slipshod administrator. It is clear, though, that whether by accident or consciously, there was collusion between Carlson and EAESP which allowed the latter to take the money, but avoid Carroll's intellectualizing agenda: Again, in at least diverting the will of part of the FF, Brazilian actors had some agency in limiting its "dominating" power.

The second set of contributions we make connected the substantial interest in the internationalization and globalization of management education in *AMLE* to the importance *AMLE* has attached to history per se. The significances we can claim with respect to the former are myriad, but that which we see as most important is the importance of historical, as well as cultural understanding in international and global management education. To illustrate, the U.S.-supported overthrow of democracy in 1964 in Brazil still matters to Brazilians, as the liberal-right newspaper *Folha de São Paulo* recently headlined: "50 Years After the 1964 Coup, the Military Dictatorship Still Bothers Brazil" (24 March, 2014). The *O Globo* public apology for its role in support of the dictatorship was, as it states, a response to present day criticisms. Chants in the 2013 Brazilian mass street demonstrations included "*A verdade é dura, a Globo apoiou a ditadura*" (The truth is strong, Globo supported the dictatorship).

This might, one supposes, be categorized as part of the "cultural profile" of Brazil. We would argue here that history is demeaned by its categorization as a cultural variable. Whether one accepts this, the general events of the coup d'état and the specifics of the development of management education in Brazil will have occurred long before many international managers will have begun their careers, and if not, in a country far away of which most international managers (the non-Brazilian ones, note Fleury & Fleury, 2011) will have known very little. Our point is that this temporal and spatial distance makes the history we describe impossible to incorporate in the experiential reflection that proponents of cultural intelligence advocate (e.g., Earley & Peterson, 2004). A U.S. management educator working in Brazil in the present day might, having read this article, be led to reflect fruitfully on why she or he is there in the first place, given Brazilian management education capacity, within EAESP, and EBAPE which is, in turn, a small proportion of that available. She or he might also be helped by knowing that any Brazilian student or participant in their late 40s or over will have spent part of their adult life under a ruthless dictatorship supported by the United States, as well as witnessed, and perhaps participated, in its overthrow in 1985. This will also be true, of course, for the Brazilian colleagues in that age range at meetings of the Academy of Management in the United States.

This is not to suggest that there is a wholly prevalent anti-Americanism; as Alcadipani and Caldas (2012) point out, Brazilians also find aspects of the United States attractive and make it a positive point of reference in evaluating what happens in Brazil, not least in relation to management processes. Moreover, in the period since the end of the FF intervention, EAESP has achieved the relatively rare "triple accreditation" standard—accreditation by the U.S.-based AACSB (first achieved in 2000); Europe's EQUIS (2001); and AMBA (2004). This is a far more recent achievement, but the institutional development required to achieve this standing will have had to have stretched back into the 1990s and earlier. This in itself is also evidence of the school's international standing and its comparability with elite schools around the globe. While this too may cause non-Brazilian management educators active there to reflect on the need for their presence, it does too suggest that in the end, Carroll's desire that EAESP achieve some kind of ideal-type status was

eventually achieved. How this is interpreted is a matter of historiographical choice, which properly would require further research into events between 1973 and 2000 at EAESP. In the absence of such research (so far) we could hypothesize that there was some critical path which required the establishment of EAESP as the leading school in Brazil, even if it was teaching focused, and that elite position meant that as leading Brazilian businesses globalized, so its leading school chose to follow suit. What we have run into here, is what Durepos and Mills (2012) identify as the problem with beginnings and endings in historiographical analysis. Our beginning and our ending are those of the FF's intervention. A different history would have emerged had we chosen EAESP's engagements with the AACSB, EQUIS, and AMBA as our end—different in periodization, institutional and individual actors, and contrary in outcome, as credibility by U.S. standards would have, this time, been achieved. Paradoxically, though, triple accreditation does not delete the prior lived experience of those current EAESP faculty members who lived and worked through some or all of the events we described here. Indeed some of these faculty will have been among those responsible for EAESP's triple accreditation. So, the history we have set out here and the significances we claim for it still stand, and comparison of more recent, and Cold War EAESP history, in what Durepos and Mills (2012) might call a history of histories, reveals EAESP as a hybrid case in point in Kipping et al.'s (2004) sense.

This hybridity may not just be a consequence of history, but an ongoing strategic necessity. While Brazil, a BRIC country, is now a leading global power, Brazil-in-the-World operates uniquely—for example, Brazilian managers of MNCs, and managers of Brazilian MNCs (i.e., a large component of EAESP's immediate client base) work from a grounding in hybrid institutions, cultures, and histories (Fleury & Fleury, 2011). Brazil-in-the-World also operates differently in terms of economic policy. In 2009, then President Lula claimed that Brazil was one of the "last into the global financial crisis, and the first out" (Barber & Wheatley, 2009), and in a broader economic history of Brazil, EAESP might be enumerated among those institutions which have continued to shape their unique economic policy and institutional path, dynamically changing though it is, even at the time of writing. However, Lula's simultaneous remark, that "the crisis was caused by irrational behavior of

white people with blue eyes, who before seemed to know everything and now demonstrate they do not know anything" (De Gois, 2009) confirms that broader history, like the one we have presented here, would for completeness have to take into account cultural-geopolitical dimensions. The geopolitics of knowledge is the thread between Lula's worldview, and the account of EAESP and the FF presented here.

Focusing back on the United States, there is also evidence in our analysis that challenges the implication of Past-President Paul Adler that it is the AoM's international members, those in the "regions" whose "scholarly capabilities" will be bettered by their engagement with the AoM, and by implication, with its "domestic" (i.e., U.S.-American members). For sure, our history is of an institution evading U.S. scholarly norms. Yet one interpretation here is that the Brazilians of EAESP were still "smarter" than the U.S. actors. Indeed, arguably they ran rings round them. Our proposition is that they did so for the greater good of EAESP and for management education in Brazil; that they knew better about what would work than the consultants and dominating institutions sent to help them. Counterarguments to claims that faculty were too overcommitted elsewhere are that in fact, they were deeply committed to the school (or why were they there at all), and that their representation as "homo economicus" within the FF does them a disservice. This EAESP commitment was not manifest in research activity of the sort which would have pleased Tom Carroll, but it does explain the evidential ambiguity, that the school is successful and growing, thanks to FF funding, but not in the way the FF would have wished.

Boring's assertion that, after all, "São Paulo is not East Lansing," perhaps reflects his view of the comparative smartness of U.S. and Brazilian players in their encounter. The tenor of his point is that it is EAESP faculty who are the worldly, sophisticated players located in the cosmopolitan national financial center, what we now call a World City, and those from Michigan State University, in East Lansing whose culture is parochial and who are from the periphery. In this sense, the AoM's description of its U.S. membership as "domestic," with its resonance of home and homely, is perhaps more revealing than is intended and suggests that the AoM will only become truly international when the learning of its members is seen as necessarily multidirectional between "domestic" and "international" knowledge centers, and indeed, when that distinction is no longer made.

CONCLUSION

We have tried to demonstrate some of the different levels of understanding that historical research, and historical insights afford. Once such insights are "out there," in the scholarly public domain, it becomes hard to imagine a scenario wherein they might legitimately be concealed or ignored by management educators. The implication of this is that historical reflexivity has to become an essential component of the global management educators' competencies, and imbuing this in those global managers they are educating is an essential task. Difficult though this might be to achieve, this historically extended reflexivity would enable us all to come to a deeper and stronger understanding of the good and the bad things it is possible to do globally with management education. We have not here separated the "good old days" (which, in Brazil's case, weren't all that good) from the "bad new days" (which for many of us, are better than the old days). Rather, we have done the opposite, evidencing Van Fleet and Wren's (2005: 54) earlier point in *AMLE* that "how we interpret the past affects the way we understand our disciplines in the present."

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Bill Cooke (PhD Manchester) is full professor of strategic management at The York Management School, University of York, U.K. He is vice-president, Research and Publications of the British Academy of Management. Previously, Cooke was Critical Management Studies division-chair at the Academy of Management. His research on the global and historical spread of management ideas has appeared in *Journal of Management Studies*, *Organization*, *Human Relations*, *Management and Organizational History*, and *Cadernos EBAPE.br*.

Rafael Alcadipani (PhD Manchester) is associate professor at Sao Paulo School of Management, Getulio Vargas Foundation. He has been Critical Management Studies division representative-at-large of the Critical Management Studies at the Academy of Management. Alcadipani's research interests are ethnography in organizations as well as history and postcolonialism. He has published in *Organization*, *Gender, Work and Organization*, and *Human Relations*.

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